报告题目：Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry
报 告 人：罗耀（加拿大多伦多大学）
报告时间：2021年8月19日 8:00-10:00
报告地点：线上（腾讯会议）
主办单位：UG环球360官方网站
内容摘要：
We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US construction industry by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise due to markdown of wages in the labor market, or markup of prices in the product market, or both. Our analyses combine the universe of US business and worker tax records with newly collected records from US procurement auctions. We use this data to identify and estimate a model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in government projects procured through auctions. We find evidence of considerable wage- and price-setting power. This imperfect competition creates sizable rents, three-fourths of which is captured by the firms. The incentives of firms to mark down wages and reduce employment due to wage-setting power are attenuated by their price-setting power in the product market.
报告人简介：
宾州州立大学经济学博士，多伦多大学经济系教师，主要从事产业组织和应用计量领域的研究。研究获得 SSHRC、NET Institute 等的资助，项目涵盖价格歧视、捆绑销售、非线性定价、实证拍卖和信用评级等，主要用于分析中国电信市场、政府招投标、拍卖、钢铁行业以及金融等。成果发表在 Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic and Statistics, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Econometrics, International Economic Review 等学术期刊。
